Since the number of server providing the facilities for users is usually more than one, remote user authentication schemes used for multi-server architectures, rather than single server circumstance, is considered. As far as security is concerned, privacy is the most important requirements, though some other properties are also desirable in practice. Recently, a number of dynamic ID-based user authentication schemes have been proposed. However, most of those schemes have more or less weaknesses and/or security flaws. In the worst case, user privacy cannot be achieved since malicious servers or users can mount some attacks, i.e., server spoofing attack and impersonation attack, to identify the unique identifier of users and masquerade of one entity as some other. In this paper, we analyze two latest research works and demonstrate that they cannot achieve true anonymity and have some other weaknesses. We further propose the improvements to avoid those security problems. Besides user privacy, the key features of our scheme are including no verification table, freely chosen password, mutual authentication, low computation and communication cost, single registration, session key agreement, and being secure against the related attacks.
Introduction
Remote password authentication scheme is a method to authenticate remote users over an insecure channel and it has inspired a large variety of work [21] . A big step towards more efficient and secure solutions was that no password file or verification table is required to keep in a system for verifying the legitimacy of the login users [5] , [19] . Sun further proposed a revised version based on one-way function to significantly reduce the communication and computation costs [13] . In order to protect from ID-theft, Das et al. proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [3] . The revised version of Das et al.'s scheme is provided by Chien and Chen to conquer the weakness of the protection of user's anonymity [2] . Besides the protection of user privacy against outside attacks, Kim et al.'s effort [8] is to provide traceable anonymity authentication. When perceiving a user doing a malicious act, the remote server will be able to trace the malicious user by receiving help from a trust agency. Since the number of server providing the facilities for users is usually more than one, remote user authentication schemes used for multiserver architectures, rather than single-server circumstance, is considered [20] , [22] . These conventional single-server password authentication schemes cannot be directly applied to multi-server environment because each user needs to remember different sets of identities and passwords [16] - [18] . Li et al. [9] presented a remote password authentication scheme for multi-server environments in which the password authentication system is a pattern classification system based on an artificial neural network. An efficient solution with much less computational cost and key agreement is given in Juang's work [7] . Liao and Wang [11] indicated that a threat to user privacy is caused by the use of static ID for password authentication. Instead, a secure dynamic ID-based scheme to achieve user's anonymity is proposed in their work. Then, an efficient improvement over Liao-Wang's scheme is given by Hsiang and Shih in 2009. However, we demonstrate in this paper that the aforementioned two schemes suffer from a few severe security problems, and some of the security properties, especially, user's anonymity cannot be satisfied. For example, the computed data associated to the fixed secret identifier can be trace and identify the profile of the user until the user changes his/her password. A shared secret value among servers is not secure against server spoofing attack and impersonation attack [15] . In this paper, we give a thorough security analysis of the Liao-Wang's scheme and further propose the improvements to avoid these problems. The proposed scheme can meet the following set of security properties on a remote authentication scheme: (1) no verification table, (2) freely chosen password, (3) mutual authentication, (4) low computation and communication cost, (5) single registration, (6) session key agreement, (7) user anonymity, (8) access control, and (9) security. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Sects. 2 and 3, we analyze Liao-Wang's and Hsiang-Shih's schemes, respectively. Section 4 presents the proposed scheme in detail. Section 5 gives the discussion of security, performance and functionality analysis on our scheme. Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of our achievements.
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Review of Liao-Wang's Scheme

The Liao-Wang's Scheme
For completeness and readability, the notations used in this paper are defined in Table 1 . In 2007, Liao and Wang proposed a "secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment" that uses dynamic ID instead of static ID to achieve user's anonymity for verifying the legitimacy of a remote login user [11] . There are three different roles, including of the user, server and register center, and four phases, including of registration phase, login phase, mutual verification and session key agreement phase, and password change phase, involved in the scheme.
A. Registration phase U i chooses ID i and PW i and then submits them to RC. Upon receiving data, RC conducts the following steps:
Step 1:
and y into a smart card, and issues it to U i via a secure channel.
B. Login phase U i presents smart card and keys his/her ID * i , PW * i and S ID j . Then, the smart card performs the following steps:
Step 1: Compute T * i = V i ⊕ h(ID * i ||PW * i ), check whether H i and h(T * i ) is met or not, and reject the case if the verification doesn't hold.
Step 2: Generate a nonce N i and compute
Step 3: Send the login request message <CID i , P i j , Q i , N i > to S j . Upon receiving the login request message, the service provider S j authenticates the user U i with the following steps:
C. Mutual verification and session key agreement phase
Step 2: Compare the computed value h(B i ||N i ||y) with Q i and abort the session if any component is invalid.
When receiving the acknowledge message, the user U i performs the following steps:
Step 4: Compare the computed value h(B i ||N i ||y||S ID j ) with M i j1 . If the verification holds, the legality of the S j is authenticated; otherwise, the connection is terminated.
Step 5: Compute and send
When receiving the message M i j2 , the service provider S j responds to the following steps:
Step 6: Check the computed value h(B i ||N j ||y||S ID j ) with M i j2 . If it is hold, the identity of U i can be assured.
After conducting mutual authentication, the session key S K = h(B i ||N i ||N j ||y||S ID j ) can be computed by S j and U i , respectively.
D. Password change phase
The user U i presents the smart card with (ID * i , PW * i ) and conducts the steps of login phase to verify the identity of the cardholder. After the authenticity of U i is assured, the smart card allows the cardholder to resubmit a new pass-
, and updates the correspondents stored in the card.
Security Analysis of the Liao-Wang's Scheme
In Liao and Wang's effort, the use of dynamic-ID instead of static ID for password authentication is given due to user's anonymity. However, their scheme is not effective against server spoofing attack and impersonation attack, and failed to achieve the purpose of user anonymity. The key point to the failure is two secret values (h(x), y) shared among service providers that observe the login request message <CID i , P i j , Q i , N i > and perform the following operations to trace the identity of users.
• Server spoofing attack: Once the user initiates the login phase, each of service providers can compute (T i , h(PW i ), B i ) and respond the computed value M i j1 = h(B i ||N i ||y||S ID j ) to the user. Figure 1 illustrates the details of the attacking steps. • Impersonation attack: The malicious service provider can use (T i , h(PW i ), B i ) to login other servers on behalf of the legal of the user by computing the login request message. The detail treatment of impersonation attack is shown in Fig. 2 . • Invalid anonymity: The goal of user anonymity is to achieve by the mask CID i of the real identity of users. However, malicious servers can get T i by computing
is a fixed value that aims to trace the behavior of the specific user.
Review of Hsiang-Shih's Scheme
The Hsiang-Shih's Scheme
Hsiang and Shih in 2009 [6] provided the improvements to Liao-Wang's work. In their work, there are three kinds of participants involved, that is, the user, the server and register center. It consists of four phases: registration phase, login phase, mutual verification and session key agreement phase and password change phase. The notations please refer to Table 1 . In contrast to Liao-Wang's scheme, only RC knows the master secret key x and two secret numbers r and y.
A. Registration phase
• Server registration: A secret key h(S ID j ||y) is computed by RC and kept at a service provider S j . • User registration: The user U i submits ID i and PW i to RC, and RC performs the following steps:
Step R1: U i freely selects a password PW i , an arbitrary number b and computes h(b ⊕ PW i ).
Step R2:
Step R3:
and issues it to U i via secure channel.
Step R5: U i enters b into his/her smart card.
B. Login phase
In order to request services from S j , U i inserts the smart card into a card reader, and keys his/her ID i , PW i and S ID j . Then, the smart card performs the following steps:
Step L1:
, check whether H * i and H i is equal or not, and abort the session if any component is invalid. Otherwise, U i proceeds to the next step.
Step L2: Generate a nonce N i and compute
C. Mutual verification and session key agreement phase
When receiving the login request message <CID i , P i j , Q i , D i , C 0 , N i >, S j authenticates U i with the following steps:
StepV1: Generate nonce N jr , compute M jr = h(S ID j ||y) ⊕ N jr , and forward <M jr , S ID j , D i , C 0 , N i > to RC.
Upon receiving the message <M jr , S ID j , D i , C 0 , N i >, RC performs the following steps:
Upon receiving the response <C 1 , C 2 , N r j >, S j performs the following steps:
StepV3: Compare C 1 = h(N jr ||h(S ID j ||y)||N r j ) with C 1 . If they are not equal, S j reports a RC authentication error message and terminates this session. StepV4:
StepV5: Compute h(B i ||A i ||N i ) and compare it with Q i . If they are not equal, S j rejects the login request and terminates this session. StepV6: Generate nonce N j , compute M i j = h(B i ||N i ||A i ||S ID j ), and send the message <M i j , N j > back to U i .
Upon receiving the acknowledgement message <M i j , N j >, U i performs the following steps:
StepV7: Compute h(B i ||N i ||A i ||S ID j ) and compare it with M i j . If they are equal, it indicates that the legitimacy of S j is authenticated; otherwise, the connection is interrupted.
Upon receiving the message M i j , S j responds to the following step:
StepV9: Compare h(B i ||N j ||A i ||S ID j ) with M i j and the identity of U i can be assured, if it is on hold.
After finishing mutual authentication phase, U i and S j compute h(B i ||A i ||N i ||N j ||S ID j ) as the session key.
D. Password change phase
When U i wants to update his password without the help of RC, the steps are as follows:
Step C1: U i inserts the smart card into reader device and inputs ID i and PW i . 
Security Analysis of the Hsiang-Shih's Scheme
Hardware implementations of cryptosystems may leak sensitive information about the secret key [12] . The secret key of an executing cryptographic algorithm could be extracted by monitoring the power consumption of a smart card [14] . Unfortunately, Hsiang and Shih's work is failed to protect the secret values (V i , B i , H i , R i , h(), b) stored in the smart card with some ways. The attacker can easily impersonate legitimate remote servers or users without knowing any password.
• Server spoofing attack: In Hsiang and Shih's scheme, RC only uses h(x ⊕ r) to verify the legitimacy of a user. From insider attacks, a legal user or remote server can impersonate as any other remote server because the legal user is possession of h(x ⊕ r) and the session key S K during login phase. The malicious user conducts server spoofing attack with the following steps that are illustrated in Fig. 3 :
Step 1: The malicious user performs power analysis attack [12] to get B i and R i . Step 2: The h(b ⊕ PW i ) is known at the step R1 of registra-tion phase. A i = B i ⊕h(b⊕PW i ) and h(x⊕r) = A i ⊕R i are computed to obtain h(x ⊕ r).
The malicious server conducts server spoofing attack with the following steps that are illustrated in Fig. 4 :
Step 1: The remote server receives message <CID i , P i j , Q i ,
Step 2: S j generates nonce N jr , computes M jr = h(S ID j ||y) ⊕ N jr , and sends the message
h(N jr ||h(S ID j ||y)||N r j ) and C 2 = A i ⊕h(h(S ID j ||y)⊕ N jr ), and then sends the message <C 1 , C 2 , N r j > back to S j .
Step 4: The malicious server computes
• Invalid anonymity: The computation of CID i , P i j , Q i and nonce is used to achieve the goal of anonymity. However, the malicious server can acquire T i by computing T i = P i j ⊕h(A i ||N i ||S ID j )) to trace the behavior of a user because T i = h(ID i ||x) and
are two fixed values that may leak user identity information.
The Proposed Scheme
A novel privacy-preserving dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme with access control for multi-server environment is proposed to solve those security problems.
In which, Lagrange's interpolating polynomial to compute a curve polynomial F(L) [9] is used for the purpose of access control. The assumption of server codes and role values for access control is (1, 3) (2, 11) (3, 17) to compute Lagrange's curve polynomial F(L) = −x 2 + 11x − 7. The proposed scheme consists of five phases: the registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase, and track phase. 
A. Registration phase
The registration phase illustrated in Fig. 5 deals with server registration and user registration.
• Server registration: Before service operation, the service provider S j submits his/her S ID j to the trusted RC via secure channel. RC computes a secret number y j = h(h(x)||S ID j ) and sends it to S j via secure channel. • User registration: Before a user U i can access services, U i has to submit ID i and PW i to RC via secure channel. RC generates the curve polynomial F(L) as access rights of U i and computes
, h()> into a smart card and issues it to U i via secure channel.
B. Login phase
When U i wants to access S j , U i inserts smart card into the card reader and inputs ID * i and PW * i for verifying the legality of a cardholder. Then, the smart card performs the following steps that are shown in Fig. 6 :
Step 1: Compute T * i = V i ⊕ h(ID * i ||PW * i ) and check whether H i and h(T * i ) is equal or not. If the verification holds, the legitimacy of U i can be assured and proceeds to the next step; otherwise, reject the login request.
Step 2: Generate the nonce N i and compute secret number
Step 3: Use the identity S ID j of S j into polynomial F(L) to get the role value P and compute P L = P ⊕ h(y * j ||N i ).
Step 4: Compute G i = CID ⊕ h(y * j ||N i ) and C = h(CID i ||Q||P||N i ).
Step 5: Send the login request message <C, G i , Q, P L , N i > to the service provider S j . Fig. 6 Login and authentication phase.
C. Authentication phase
When receiving the login request message <C, G i , Q, P L , N i >, S j authenticates the user U i with the following steps that are shown in Fig. 6 :
Step 1: Compute CID * i = G i ⊕ h(y j ||N i ) and P * = P L ⊕ h(y j , N i ) and check whether C and h(CID * i ||Q||P * ||N i ) is equal or not. If the verification doesn't hold, S j rejects the login request and terminates the session.
Step 2: Verify Q with every data h(T i ||N i ) stored in the blacklist of malicious users given by RC at Track phase. When a match is found, S j rejects the login request.
Step 3: Generate the nonce N j , compute M 1 = h(CID * ||S ID j ||N i ), and then send back the message
Upon receiving the acknowledgement message, U i performs the following steps:
Step 4: Compute h(CID i ||S ID * j ||N i ) and compare it with M 1 . If they are equivalent, it indicates that the legality of S j . Otherwise, this session is interrupted.
Step 5: Compute M 2 = h(CID i ||S ID j ||N j ) and send back M 2 to S j .
After receiving the response M 2 from U i , S j conducts the last step at authentication phase.
Step 6: Check whether M 2 and h(CID * i ||S ID j ||N j ) is equal or not and abort the session if the verification doesn't hold.
After finishing authentication phase, the user U i and the service provider S j compute h(CID i ||S ID j ||N i ||N j ) as the session key S K.
D. Password Change Phase
The user U i can update his/her password without the help of RC. U i inserts the smart card to card reader and input (ID * i , PW * i ) corresponding to the smart card. Then, the smart card performs the following steps:
Step 1: 
E. Track phase
On discovering a malicious user, the service provider S j collects the relevant data regarding the user U i and obtains U i 's real identity with the cooperation of RC.
Step 1: The server S j sends CID i and N i to RC.
Step 2: When receiving the track request message (CID i , N i ), RC computes ID i = CID i ⊕ h(h(x)||N i ) and T i = h(ID i ||x).
Step 3: RC updates the blacklist of malicious users with T i and sends the latest version of the blacklist to all of servers in order to trace and reject a malicious user at once.
Discussions
Security Analysis
A security analysis on the proposed scheme is given in accordance with the list of requirements discussed in academic literature.
• Replay attack: Replay attack is one of active attacks that an adversary records a communication session and replays the entire session, or a portion thereof, at some later point in time. The use of nonce N i and N j by demonstrating knowledge of a secret known to be associated with the involved parties S j and U i in login and authentication phases to compute the related data, including of C, Q, G i , A L , M 1 and M 2 . Obviously, our scheme is effective against such an attack. • Parallel session attack: A parallel session attack occurs when two or more protocol runs are executed concurrently and messages from one run (the reference session) are used to form spoofed messages in another run (the attack session). In which, it can also successfully impersonate a legal user, however, without having to hazard the possibility of exposing the attacker's identity. In view of this, the secret number y * j = h(h(x)||S ID * j ) in our scheme is computed by the smart card and only the designate server can verify the legitimacy of the user.
• Stolen verified attack: Our scheme does not maintain any verification table and thus can achieve stolenverified attack resistance. • Guess password attack: In our scheme, the password is encapsulated in the message <C, G i , Q, P L , N i > by the use of the hash operation and the exclusive-or operation during login and authentication phase. Hence, it is effective against more common methods of password cracking. • Server spoofing attack: The unique secret key y j is the key to obtain the required data CID i from G i and compute the authentication message M 1 = h(CID i ||S ID j ||N j ). The inability of malicious users or servers to masquerade as a valid service provider is assured because of a lack of y j only known by the authorized S j . • Impersonation attack: The adversary cannot masquerade as a legal user to login the remote server S j even though he may get R i , V i , H i , F(L) and h(·) from the user's smart card. This is because the secret key x, y j and U i 's password PW i cannot be derived from these data and thus a valid login message cannot be generated. Besides, a legal user U i cannot masquerade as the other legal user U j to login the remote server S j without the password PW j .
Performance and Functionality Analysis
We then summarize some features related to practicability and effectiveness in this section.
• Freely chosen password: In the beginning of the password change phase, the validity of the cardholder will be confirmed. The user U i inserts his smart card into a card reader and enters his identity ID * i and password PW * i corresponding to his smart card. Then, the legal cardholder can freely choose and change password at will without the help of RC. • Session key agreement: In consideration of the security of session key generation, three security criteria are crucial for session key agreement [1] , [4] , [7] .
(1) Known key security: Only knowing a compromised session key cannot determine the other used session keys. In our scheme, the session key S K i associated to CID i and T i is dynamic at every session to conduct mutual authentication with the user and the server. Even though a session key S K i is disclosed, it is infeasible to compute S K j due to insufficient data CID i and T i based on the security of one-way hash function and exclusive-or operation.
(2) Session key security: At the end of the key agreement, the session key is known to nobody but the user and the server. In our scheme, the session key S K = h(CID i ||S ID j ||N i ||N j ) is known to nobody but S j and U i since the secrecy of CID i is concealed in the parameter G i .
(3) Forward secrecy: A compromised secret key cannot derive the session keys used before. In our scheme, a compromised long-lived secret key x cannot be used to derive the session key S K = h(CID i ||S ID j ||N i ||N j ) used before without knowing the used nonce values N i and N j .
• Single registration: A new user just needs to register at RC once that is issued a smart card with the necessary secret information. Then, the user can login all the legal servers of the remote system by the use of the smart card and his/her password. • User anonymity: The user U i will send the login request (C, G i , Q, P L , N i ) to the server S j in each login. Due to nonce N i , the login message associated to the secret ID i , however, is dynamic for running sessions to fulfill mutual authentication. The proposed scheme is accomplishment of anonymity goals. • Traceability of malicious users: To make privacy protection more secure, the protection of user anonymity from remote servers is achieved in our scheme. In which, we deal with the balance of anonymity versus accountability known as accountable anonymity. That is, the server has the ability to identify malicious users from the blacklist T i = h(ID i ⊕ x) issued by RC in the track phase. • Comparison of functionality: Table 2 summarizes the Table 2 Comparison of functionality. Table 3 Comparison of performance. functionality discussion given above and gives the comparison results among our scheme and the related schemes. Unfortunately, most recent studies only provide the countermeasure against outside attackers and thus they cannot provide user privacy as claimed. The proposed scheme provides the protection of user anonymity from inside attackers and further, against conspiracy attack. No one else but the trusted RC knows the real identity of a user. On discovering malicious behaviors of a user, all of servers have the blacklist of malicious users given by RC and reject the service request when a mach is found.
• Comparison of performance: Table 3 shows the comparison results in the computation cost. The computation cost of the XOR operation is smaller than the hash function; and further, the computation cost of the hash function is smaller than the symmetric encryption/decryption. It is obvious that the proposed scheme is more efficient than the others.
Conclusion
Within the rapid growth of those e-commerce applications a remote user authentication with anonymity toward security and privacy concerns is very promising. Users will find it unacceptable that their daily online activities can be freely recorded, linked and traced back to their identities unconditionally. In this paper, we briefly reviewed Liao-Wang's and Hsiang-Shih's scheme that is effective against user's anonymity in most cases. However, we found that it cannot achieve true anonymity, i.e., in case of insider attacks. We further proposed the improvements to avoid such an attack.
The key features of our scheme are including of no verification table, freely chosen password, mutual authentication, low computation and communication cost, single registration, and secure against the related attacks. Moreover, an integrated management environment for authentication and key agreement is required for practical applications and introduced in the proposed scheme.
